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INTRODUCTION:  
FAITH, RATIONALITY AND THE PASSIONS
Sarah Coakley
The papers gathered in this issue of Faith and Philosophy were first pre-
sented at the “Faith, Rationality and the Passions” conference which I con-
vened at the University of Cambridge, January 11–13, 2010. They have 
been lightly edited and revised for this issue, after the customary readers’ 
reports. I would like to record my particular gratitude to the John Temple-
ton Foundation for generously funding the symposium, to Dr. Mary Ann 
Meyers of the Foundation for making all the practical arrangements for 
the conference with her customary grace, and to the editor of Faith and 
Philosophy, Professor Thomas Flint, for kindly agreeing to publish these 
papers together. Readers of Faith and Philosophy may also like to know that 
the remaining papers from the conference (gathered into a second, the-
matic cluster) are due to appear in a related journal issue: that of Modern 
Theology for April 2011.1
Taken together, the papers represent—as will be specially clear from 
this issue—a certain revisionary re-thinking of the relation of “reason” 
(however construed) and “passion” or “emotion” in certain classic West-
ern philosophical sources. If one had to identify a prime uniting theme in 
the papers gathered here, it is that the supposed “modern” disjunction of 
reason and feeling in Western philosophy has been vastly exaggerated in 
late-modern renditions, if not actively manipulated by the secondary liter-
ature: neither Descartes nor Kant (nor even Kierkegaard), when carefully 
and discerningly read, propose any such disjunction. Essays by John Cot-
tingham (Descartes), John Hare (Kant), and Merold Westphal (Kierkeg-
aard) make this point penetratingly, whilst also indicating how careful 
the reader must be in understanding the various ways in which “reason,” 
1The papers gathered in the forthcoming Modern Theology issue (April, 2011) are: Sarah 
Coakley, “Introduction: Faith, Rationality and the Passions”; William Cavanaugh, “The In-
vention of Fanaticism and the Myth of Religious Violence”; Catherine Pickstock, “The Late 
Arrival of Language: Word, Nature and the Divine in Plato’s Cratylus”; Columba Stewart, 
O.S.B., “Evagrius and the Eastern Monastic Tradition on the Intellect and Passions”; John 
Milbank, “Hume versus Kant: Faith, Reasoning and Feeling”; Thomas Dixon, “Revolting Pas-
sions”; Stephen Mulhall, “Wittgenstein on Faith, Rationality and the Passions”; Gerald Clore, 
“Psychology and the Rationality of Emotion”; Michael Spezio, “The Neuroscience of Emo-
tion and Reasoning in Social Contexts: Implications for Moral Theology”; Sarah Coakley, 
“Postscript: What (if Anything) can the Sciences Tell Philosophy and Theology about Faith, 
Rationality and the Passions?”
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“passion,” “feeling” and “faith” are to be construed in the works of the 
philosophers under review. Each presents a distinctive view. Douglas 
Hedley’s paper on de Maistre likewise indicates how a lesser-known En-
lightenment thinker has been wrongly pilloried as a defender of dark pas-
sion and violence, when his philosophical interests were, on the contrary, 
fuelled by neo-Platonic, and specifically Origenist, interests in a universal-
ist theodicy.
A second, and sub-theme, in this collection is one that probes behind 
this early modern and modern heritage on the reason/feeling theme, and 
asks how the thought of Augustine and Aquinas prepares us for the twists 
that occur later in the West—as reason is progressively secularized, and 
“passion” transmuted into “emotion.”2 The integrative readings that mark 
the papers on modern philosophers in this issue find their historical back-
cloth in Paul Griffiths’s rendition of the significance of rightly-ordered 
passion in Augustine, and Eleonore Stump’s suggestive re-reading of 
Thomas’s virtue theory—as profoundly engaged with affective transfor-
mation. The latter paper, especially, is bound to be controversial amongst 
virtue theorists who read Thomas as an “Aristotelian” of a certain stripe. 
If Stump is correct, their presumption that Thomas disjoins feeling and 
reason is distorted by another, modern, misreading: one that drives a 
wedge between “Humean” and “Kantian” assessments of feeling in the 
ethical realm. Moreover, such readings also misleadingly bracket away 
the significance of the third part of the Summa Theologiae, and especially 
the treatment of pneumatology there, for Thomas’s rich understanding of 
the virtuous life.
Finally, this collection of essays is book-ended by two papers which, 
rather than attempting re-readings of classic sources as such, make nor-
mative suggestions for contemporary philosophical method and for the 
philosophical theory of emotions, respectively, and especially as they re-
late to religious faith. Charles Taylor’s broad-ranging essay presents a sys-
tematic assault on what he perceives as the myth of “disengaged” scientif-
ic reason, and urges the reconsideration of “meaning-making” (including 
religious meaning-making) as endemic to the pursuit of “rationality,” tout 
court. Finally, Peter Goldie surveys the field of recent secular philosophy 
of emotions, and concludes that theological ethics may—perhaps surpris-
ingly—have much to learn from it, despite its apparently reductive pre-
sumptions. Again, the task of an integrative approach to reason, feeling, 
and faith opens up creatively to the future, strongly assisted by bold re-
readings of the classic Western philosophical heritage.
University of Cambridge
2The birth of “emotion” as a category replacing (but not entirely coterminous with) “pas-
sion” is surprisingly late, as this collection of essays indicates. For a precise historical account 
of this transition see Thomas Dixon’s essay in the Modern Theology issue (n. 1), and ibid., From 
Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
